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Abstract
This paper seeks to investigate the inner mechanics of policy change. It aims to discover how
ideas enter the political arena, and how endogenous forces within the policy making environment
transform ideas into new policies. The central hypothesis is that in times of crisis, new ideas
emanate from a number of change agents, but in order for any of these ideas to enter the institutional
environment, one specific agent of change must be present: the political entrepreneur. Without
political entrepreneurs, ideational change, and subsequent policy change, would not occur. The
paper sets out a framework for identifying and explaining the endogenous drivers of policy change,
and then tests this framework on two case studies, from two countries.
KEYWORDS: crisis, policy, change, political, entrepreneur
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Introduction
When Sir Ralph Harris, head of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA),
suggested to Margaret Thatcher that the IEA had been advocating market reform
and monetarism two decades prior to her election as Prime Minister, Thatcher
quipped: “But remember [Ralph] while the cocks may crow, it’s the hen that lays
the egg” (Blundell 2008, 8). This captures our paper’s hypothesis that, in the
context of an exogenous shock (in this case a crisis in the British economy in
1979), the political entrepreneur is the main agent of policy change. The political
entrepreneur acts as a bridge between those developing/advocating new policy
ideas – policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1995), policy networks (Pemberton 2000)
or other change agents (Hall 1993) – and the institutions implementing them. In
the network of actors contributing to policy change, the political entrepreneur sits
at the centre of the process. Without a political entrepreneur to inject the new
ideas of policy entrepreneurs into the political arena at times of crisis such as
recessions, wars, or political instability, policy change will not occur.
Although the concepts of political and policy entrepreneurship have
received attention in the literature, “the concept of policy entrepreneurship is yet
to be broadly integrated within studies of policy change” (Mintrom and Norman
2009, 649-650). To address this lacuna, our paper examines case studies from two
countries experiencing economic crises during the mid 1970s and early 1980s.
Such historical cross-national studies hold considerable promise for achieving a
conceptual breakthrough in our understanding of policy change (Mintrom and
Norman 2009).
This paper initially discusses the institutional and policy change literature,
then examines the various types of change agents before setting out the
hypotheses for identifying policy change and testing these against the selected
cases. The conclusion highlights the paper’s significance and limitations.

Institutional Analysis and Explanations of Change
The issue of policy change has often been addressed in political science literature
through the concept of exogenous shocks. Crises are regularly blamed for
destabilising polices. For instance, Greener (2001) argues that exogenous shocks
result in new policy paradigms. As a result, the policy change literature (Collier
and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001) has sought to perfect our identification of crises
and critical junctures. However, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to
the mechanics through which crises result in policy change.
The critical junctures concept was co-opted by path dependence scholars
as a means of accounting for change. This is akin to the use of punctuated
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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equilibrium in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory (Gould and Eldredge 1977).
Consequently, a regularly invoked interpretation of policy change has divided
history into “normal periods” and “critical junctures,” during which major change
is possible (Gorges 2001). The concepts of critical junctures and exogenous
shocks have sometimes been reduced to a deus ex machina to explain change that
has proved otherwise inexplicable. Thus, exogenous explanations for sudden and
dramatic shifts in policies tend to be crude. Orren and Skowronek (1994) observe
that punctuated equilibrium models ignore many of the characteristics of change
and ignore endogenous characteristics of change specifically. Thus, the problem
here seems to be the use of exogenous shocks in a deterministic fashion that
ignores endogenous entities – constituents such as policy and political
entrepreneurs – that respectively generate and institutionalise emergent policy
ideas. However, without the notion of exogenous shocks to initiate the change
process, path dependence is reduced to an equilibrium model. Yet, at a time of
crisis, if we can look within an institution for sources of policy change, in terms
of idea generation and idea advocacy, we can avoid the necessity of having to rely
exclusively upon exogenous explanations for policy change.
Crises expose decision makers to criticism and demands for more effective
action (Walsh 2006), resulting in policy change. Yet, sometimes crises do not
result in policy changes. What accounts for this inconsistency? Walsh (2006)
argues that policy change is most likely to occur when an alternative policy idea
can explain past failures and secure the support of powerful constituents. It is to
these powerful constituents, capable of generating and advocating alternative
policy ideas, that we now turn.

Agents of Change
The term political entrepreneur, as an explicit concept, was developed by Dahl
(1961) (McCaffrey and Salerno 2011). Dahl (1961, 6) contended that the political
entrepreneur is the crucial agent of change, and “is not so much the agent of
others as others are his agents.” The political entrepreneur picks and chooses from
policy ideas put forward by policy entrepreneurs at times of crisis and shapes the
terms of political debate by influencing agendas and constructing cultural frames
(Hwang and Powell 2005). They “exploit moments of instability” created by
exogenous shocks and “invest resources in the creation of a new policy, or new
forms of collective action,” having “transformative effects on politics, policies,
and institutions” (Sheingate 2003, 188-190).
Kingdon (1995) suggests that change agents encompass a broad grouping
of what he terms “policy entrepreneurs.” When a policy is in difficulty, due to an
exogenous shock for instance, windows of opportunity appear in which policy
2
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entrepreneurs challenge the existing paradigm (Kingdon 1995). They present a
range of new ideas to replace the ones upon which existing policy is based and in
the process vie for the attention of politicians to get their ideas into the policymaking environment. Policy entrepreneurs encompass civil servants, technocrats,
academics, economists and interest groups, etc. that engage in policy innovation
and have some access to decision makers.
Pemberton (2000) identifies change agents as belonging to a policy
network schema. In this case, the policy entrepreneurs are essential for advocating
new policy ideas to replace failing arrangements at times of crisis. However, the
role of the political entrepreneur willing to become an idea’s “champion” is
crucial. The result is the creation of coalitions among a variety of policy
entrepreneurs and the political entrepreneur, whereby “ideas facilitate the
reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources” (Blyth 2002,
37). Political entrepreneurs are the bridge between those advocating new policy
ideas (policy entrepreneurs) and the institutions implementing them. As such,
political entrepreneurs, by influencing agendas, shape the terms of political debate
(Hwang and Powell 2005). “Successful political entrepreneurs are able to
consolidate innovations, producing political or social change that has enduring
effects in the form of new programs, policies, or organizations” (Hwang and
Powell 2005, 214). This recognises leadership as a situational phenomenon,
whereby leaders can take institutions/policies in particular directions (Wallis and
Dollery 1997). This paper contends that, at times of exogenous shocks, policy
entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible for producing new ideas, but
the political entrepreneur acts as a figurehead, introducing these ideas into the
policy process. The political entrepreneur, at the head of an entrepreneurial
network of policy entrepreneurs, is capable of engaging in the process of creative
destruction in relation to policy.
The relationship between policy and political entrepreneurs can be
illustrated by the astronomical concept of a nebula, wherein the gravitational
mechanics result in the clustering of particles to produce mass and eventually
stars. Like such particles, there are always policy entrepreneurs with policy ideas,
swirling around in the policy making environment. In the wake of a crisis, policy
entrepreneurs vie for the attention of politicians to get their ideas into the policymaking arena. If a politician is willing to act as a political entrepreneur and
champion a new idea, they can draw policy entrepreneurs and other interests to
them, building a mass of support behind the policy idea they are advocating
(Figure 1). There are advantages for each side in the relationship. The political
entrepreneur benefits from the expertise of policy entrepreneurs, to say nothing of
their support, while the latter benefit from the politician’s “patronage” of their
idea in the corridors of power. The more senior the political entrepreneur, and the
more determined they are in advancing a particular policy, the greater their
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entrepreneurial potential (Wallis and Dollery 1997). Thus, the process of change
is located in the interaction of ideas, actors, and institutions (Hay 2004).
Third
Order
Policy
Change

Crisis

Policy
Failure
Third
Order
Policy
Change

Political Entrepreneur
Political Elite
Policy Entrepreneur

Political
Entrepreneurs

Figure 1. The Policy Change Nebula

Framework for the Identification of Policy Change
Existing explanations of policy change, while acknowledging the role of policy
entrepreneurs, fail to integrate the separate concepts of policy and political
entrepreneurship into their transformative frameworks (Mintrom and Norman
2009). This paper seeks to develop an understanding of the endogenous forces
driving policy change, wherein the political entrepreneur, interacting with policy
entrepreneurs, plays a crucial role. Building on the work discussed above, the
paper hypothesizes that policy change occurs in three stages: initiation of the
policy debate due to a crisis, ideational change, and the advent of the political
entrepreneur. The paper seeks to help explain why, in the wake of certain crises
and policy failures, there is policy change, while at other times of crisis no change
occurs.
We will measure the nature of policy change using the concepts of first-,
second- and third-order change developed by Hall (1993). Hall (1993) argues that
exogenous shocks and policy failures can set off processes that lead to ideational
change, sometimes resulting in the re-examination of the belief systems through
which extant policy has been generated. Thus, this approach provides us with a
4
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useful tool for understanding degrees of policy change. In Hall’s (1993) view,
first order change represents a change to policy instrument settings and is a
response to policy feedback. Whilst politicians are present in the core decisionmaking network, it is policy entrepreneurs who dominate this process. Second
order change is a change to the instruments of policy and their settings and is also
driven by policy entrepreneurs, not politicians. In instances of both first and
second order change, the overall goals of policy remain the unaltered. However,
in third order change, there is change in the instrument settings, the instruments
themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy (Hall 1993). In this case it is
politicians, and not policy entrepreneurs, who dominate the process. “Such
wholesale changes in policy occur relatively rarely” (Hall 1993, 279).
The Initiation of the Policy Debate
Crises or exogenous shocks are often cited as explanations for policy change
(Greener 2001; Golob 2003), as their existence highlights a failing within existing
policies due to their implication in, or inability to right, the emergent situation
(Levy 1994). In order for policy entrepreneurs to challenge existing arrangements,
a crisis and policy failure must be identified and widely perceived (Hay 1999).
Agents must diagnose, and impose on others, their notion of a crisis before
collective action to resolve the resultant uncertainty can be taken (Blyth 2002).
Agents shape “the terms of political debate: they frame issues, define problems
and influence agendas” (Sheingate 2003, 188). They ultimately initiate a debate
concerning extant ideational orthodoxy.
In terms of macroeconomic shocks, Garrett (1993, 522) suggests that
“most scholars agree that severe recessions make significant structural changes
possible because they render politics highly fluid.” A crisis can call into question
existing policies, bringing about the possibility of change (Tilly 1975).
Accordingly:
Hypothesis 1: A crisis/exogenous shock will initiate debate concerning existing
policy arrangements.
Ideational Change
Once a crisis is identified, the failure of a prevailing policy paradigm drives
policymakers to look outside government for a solution (Oliver and Pemberton
2004). Ideas influence policy by acting though particular actors who promote an
idea and build a supporting coalition (Berman 1998). As policy entrepreneurs are
team players they can constitute an “entrepreneurial network,” the composition
and size of which can demonstrate the support for an idea (Mintrom and Norman
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2009). The triumph of a new idea from policy entrepreneurs depends upon “a
workable new idea being available” which a political entrepreneur is then
prepared to promote (Oliver and Pemberton 2004, 419). Such ideas determine the
path of subsequent policy, as policymakers work within a framework of ideas and
standards that specify not only the goals of policy, but the instruments to be used
to achieve these goals, and the nature of the problems they are meant to address
(Hall 1993).
Policy entrepreneurs function as a link between problems and the policies
introduced by political entrepreneurs to resolve those problems. Political
entrepreneurs co-ordinate the policy entrepreneurs, encouraging them to coalesce
around a decipherable set of alternative ideas; they are the link between the
innovation of the policy entrepreneurs and policy change. Thus, the political
entrepreneurs are the drivers of creative destruction.
According to Legro (2000), extant ideational collapse and new ideational
consolidation are components of the ideational change process. Should a range of
policy entrepreneurs agree that the prevailing paradigm is inadequate, ideational
collapse will occur (Legro 2000). In the wake of ideational collapse, the issue is
reaching consensus on a new set of ideas. Legro (2000) argues that if consensus is
achieved we will then see change agents co-ordinating a replacement set of ideas
to the reigning consensus. However, “failure to reach consensus on a replacement
could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old
orthodoxy” (Legro 2000, 424). Walsh (2006) sees this as the continuation of
failed policies due to a lack of coherent intellectual links between policy tools and
desired outcomes. In the wake of ideational collapse, a new idea will be adopted if
an identifiable political entrepreneur is present to champion it and the idea itself is
politically intelligible. As Thatcher suggested, the cock may crow, but there must
be a hen to lay the egg. Consequently:
Hypothesis 2: Policy failures will lead to underlying ideational collapse as policy
entrepreneurs (entrepreneurial networks) critique the current model and generate
replacement ideas, around which they will consolidate if a political entrepreneur
is present, resulting in ideational change.
Without a political entrepreneur acting as a type of ideational
figurehead/catalyst, this new idea will not enter the institutional environment.
Policy Change
Hall (1993) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, discredit the old
paradigm, leading to a re-examination of the belief systems through which that
policy was created. Outlined above is how Hall (1993) describes rare, but radical,
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and overarching changes in policy as third order changes. As we argue that
political entrepreneurs are necessary for such paradigm shifts to occur, we are
effectively using third order change as the threshold for evaluating the presence of
political entrepreneurs. This is because political entrepreneurs exploit the
uncertainty created by crises (what Blyth (2002) terms as Knightian uncertainty),
and “search for that mix of interests and appeals that can produce a winning
coalition” to generate major change (Sheingate 2003, 192). For new ideas to
overthrow extant policies the political entrepreneur must occupy a position
enabling them to challenge existing arrangements. Political entrepreneurs can be
leaders of the governing party or an opposition party, though Oliver (1997)
suggests that, for a political party, a period in opposition can be conducive to
social learning, allowing it be more open to new ideas. For an idea to triumph,
political entrepreneurs must act as ideational coordinators, bringing a broad array
of policy entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurial network together in a coalition for
ideational and policy change. Without a political entrepreneur to inject new ideas
into the policy making arena, third order/paradigm change (Hall 1993) will not
occur, as no agents within the entrepreneurial network possess the necessary
access to existing institutional arrangements to implement such change. Instead,
there may be a first order policy change (change to the policy instrument settings),
or a second order policy change (change to the setting and instruments of policy).
Consequently:
Hypothesis 3: Third order (paradigmatic) policy change will result if a political
entrepreneur injects the ideas espoused by an entrepreneurial network into the
political environment.
While policy networks constitute a particularly important intermediate variable in
enabling policy change (Pemberton 2000), the political entrepreneur is the
“crucial element.”

Methods and Country Selection
Comparative historical analysis has sought to provide temporally grounded
accounts of diverse topics in the social sciences, including accounts of policy
change. This approach is “defined by a concern with the use of systematic and
contextualized comparison” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 3). By
examining the nature of economic policy change at the national level in two
countries, namely Sweden and the United States (US), this paper seeks to add to
the extant literature, which is mostly made up of individual country examinations
that often juxtapose different levels of policy change (Howlett and Cashore 2009).
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
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Sweden in the mid 1970s and the US at the beginning of the 1980s
constitute interesting cases. Each country appeared to have reached a turning
point in their histories at these times. In Sweden, the years immediately following
the oil crisis of the early 1970s were marked by both recession and stagflation as
the economy struggled to maintain the welfare state (OECD 1978). In a context of
declining economic competiveness, rising unemployment, and a widening budget
deficit, there were worries that the Swedish Model of free enterprise coexisting
with an expansive welfare state could no longer survive (Fulcher 1991; Mjoset
1992). By the early 1980s, the US was locked in economic stagnation (Dark
2001). Stagflation led to a deep soul searching as to the country’s economic future
(Divine et al. 1995). There was a sense that the federal government lacked an
understanding of how this problem might be resolved (Spulber 1995).
In both countries there was deep anxiety – a questioning of past decisions
married with uncertainty as to how to proceed. In a sense, they were experiencing
existential angst. To many Swedes, the Swedish Model appeared unsustainable by
the mid-1970s, while, for Americans, the central tenets of the American Dream
seemed to have foundered.
In addition to being selected for having reached a crossroads in their
development, the countries were selected using a combination of most-similar and
most different criteria. Using the most similar case selection method, the same
independent variables are chosen; when employing the most different technique,
dissimilar independent variables are selected (Gerring 2007). The US and Sweden
share the overarching criteria of being long-standing democracies and capitalist
states. The specific criteria were 1) stable democracy since the first half of the
twentieth century and 2) founding membership of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), conditions uniting the principles of
representative democracy and the free market. Thus, we are examining the nature
of macroeconomic policy change within the context of different temporal
boundaries (Gerring 2007) at the national level. These countries are most different
according to Lijphart’s (1999) categories of majoritarian and consensual
democracies, allowing us to control for varying institutional arrangements.
Additionally, while the US is a federal presidential republic, Sweden is a
constitutional monarchy. Both countries’ economies’ performances, and the
policies governing them, varied during the 20th century.
The similarities ensure that “the contexts of analysis are analytically
equivalent,” while their differences place “parallel processes of change in sharp
relief” (Collier 1997, 4). The value of such cross national studies, historical in
context, is that they offer the prospect of conceptual breakthroughs in our
understanding of policy change (Lieberman 2001).
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Evaluation and Discussion
Sweden, 1976
The Economic Crisis. By the 1970s, Sweden was straining under the burden of
supporting its welfare state (Time 1976a). Increased international competition,
stagnating demand, and recession following the oil crisis of 1973 led to decline in
the steel and shipbuilding industries (Lundberg 1982). The industrial sector
shrank relative to other parts of the economy. Annual productivity growth, having
increased at 4.1 percent per year between 1950 and 1973, dropped to 1.4 percent
thereafter (Forseback 1976). The public sector’s share of GDP rose and the
number of public sector jobs, increased to maintain the image of full employment,
came to outnumber those in private industry after 1978 (Gress 1991; OECD
1992). Lindbeck (1997) argues that sluggish productivity growth was, to some
extent, the result of the increasing size of public sector.
By 1976, most economic indicators were pointing downwards. Sweden’s
unemployment rate averaged 2 percent during the 1970s, double that experienced
in the 1960s (OECD 1977). “But the maintenance of high employment had been
accompanied by less favourable performance in other areas, notably costs, prices
and the balance of payments” (OECD 1977, 42). Inflation was double that of the
previous decade, with the oil crisis contributing to prices’ upward trajectory. “In
the 1970s, wages exploded in a self-destructive series of agreements that placed
Swedish firms in the un-competitive position of having the highest paid labour
force in the world” (Ahlén 1989, 333). The balance of payments also deteriorated
sharply (OECD 1976). The economy’s growth slowed to 1 percent in 1976 from
2.5 percent the previous year before contracting in 1977 (O’Connor, O’Malley,
and Foley 1978). The government’s purist counter-cyclical fiscal policies resulted
in the budget deficit expanding significantly (Siven 1984), with the national debt
tripling within a decade (OECD 1982a).
Extant Ideational Collapse. During the 1970s, elections were dominated by
concerns over social welfare, employment, taxation, and nuclear power. As the
1976 general election approached, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party,
Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) noted declining support (Hadenius
1997). The previous three years had been marked by parliamentary deadlock due
to a close 1973 election. In 1976, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation,
Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), proposed a wage earner fund, through a levy
on corporate profits, to transfer control of enterprises with more than 50
employees to the unions (Esping-Andersen 1992). However, the SAP retreated
from the idea due to the opposition of the Swedish Employers’ Federation,
Svenska Arbetsgivarforening (SAF) (Whyman and Burkitt 1993). The nonPublished by De Gruyter, 2012
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socialist parties, “at last with an issue around which they could collectively
mobilise,” argued that the wage earner fund proposal demonstrated the SAP
wanted state dominance in the business sector, whereas the Swedish model had
been built on co-operation of both sides of industry with a neutral state (Blyth
2002, 207). The unions seemed to be moving further to the left, away from an
accommodation with capitalism and towards outright socialism, while their
political allies in the SAP were shifting to towards the center. The SAP was also
criticised from the left by the Left Party Communists, Vänsterpartiet
Kommunisterna (VPK), due to unprecedented unrest in the labour market. This
situation, rife with unfulfilled economic expectations and change agents
dissatisfied with the prevailing circumstances and paradigm, constituted
ideational collapse.
The Failure of New Ideational Consolidation. The deadlock in Parliament
between the 1973 and 1976 elections created political uncertainty, while the three
non-socialist parties (Centre, Liberal, and Moderate) became more skilled at
presenting a united front in election campaigns and Parliament (Time 1976b).
The 1976 election campaign saw the non-socialist parties unite under the
leadership of Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Centre Party (Back et al. 2009). Fälldin
depicted the SAP government as advocates of an unwieldy, inhumane society that
accorded higher priority to growth and profitability than to other, more important
values, such as the environment and individual freedom. Time (1976b) pointed
out that the growing concentration of state power and fear of the overbureaucratisation of society through the wage earner funds were the nonsocialists’ targets. This election, resulting in only small shifts in the relative
strength of the socialist and non-socialist blocs, saw the defeat of the SAP after
having ruled Sweden for 44 years (Hinnsfors 2006). The combination of the
Centre, Liberal, and Moderate parties won a five seat majority in parliament.
“The Swedish model has gone in for repair,” proclaimed the Financial Times
(Garme 2001, 133).
The discussions surrounding the election and economy did not result in the
emergence of alternative economic ideas to the existing ones, or a significant
change agent – a political entrepreneur. The SAF acted as a policy entrepreneur to
the extent that it sought to stop wage earner funds, but that was all. No other
significant policy entrepreneurs were present. No political leader was prepared to
advocate an alternative to, or an end to, social democracy. The non-socialists had
been out of power for almost half a century, so the last thing they wanted was to
dismantle the welfare state built up by the LO and SAP, for fear of another half
century in opposition. Thus, in spite of the dominant economic orthodoxy’s
failure to meet the challenges of the post oil crises world, the non-socialist parties
proved both unwilling and unable to create a coalition around alternative ideas to
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social democracy. They wanted to show the public that the welfare state was safe
with them.
First Order Policy Change. The SAP’s election defeat only resulted in what could
best be described as “business as usual” for the welfare state. The new Prime
Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin, in order to form a coalition out of the non-socialist
parties, backed away from anything that might generate controversy (Arter 2006).
For instance, his re-election promise to rapidly dismantle nuclear power plants
was shelved (Larsson, Letell, and Thörn 2012), as both the Liberals and
Moderates supported the construction of more such facilities (Time 1976a). Such
constraints on the ability to implement election promises had severe consequences
for the government’s lifespan. Ironically, there followed, under the non-socialists,
an expansion in spending to reanimate the sluggish economy, as well as increases
in sick pay, funding for child-care centres, and food subsidies (Ginsburg and
Rosenthal 2002).
Nevertheless, the employers, encouraged by the SAP’s defeat, launched an
ideological and political counter-offensive against the trade union movement
(Whyman and Burkitt 1993). In contrast to the 1930s, the balance of power
gradually shifted in the SAF’s favour. However, no change to the social
democratic nature of the state occurred after 1976. When the non-socialists came
to power they attempted to demonstrate that they were not aiming at counterrevolution and would not be tampering with the country’s well developed welfare
system (Childs 2000). Fälldin assured Swedes that he had no intention of
repealing any of their social benefits, and instead promised to try and better them
(Hadenius 1997). The new government continued to consult regularly with the
union movement, and the LO's representation on government committees and
commissions was the same after 1976 as before. But, Fälldin did interpret the
election as a mandate to break the concentration of power in the state's
bureaucracy and to halt experimentation with new social programs.
The new administration, eager to prove it would not wreck the welfare
state, took measures to ease the structural problems industry faced. Certain firms
in difficulty were nationalised while others received subsidies (O’Connor,
O’Malley and Foley 1978). The support of employment in iron ore, steel, and
shipbuilding meant preservation of inappropriate structures of production.
Unemployment also continued to be concealed by expanding public works,
training programs, and the public sector (Statistisk Arsbok 1982-83). “The results
were predictable, the budget and external current account went deep into deficit,
and inflation rose” (Delsen and van Veen 1992, 94).
After two years trying to find a solution to Sweden’s nuclear power issues,
the Fälldin government resigned. It was replaced by a Liberal minority
government, with Ola Ullsten as prime minister. This government lasted for just
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under a year. The 1979 general election saw the non-socialist parties take 49
percent of the vote and win the election by just one seat. Thorbjorn Fälldin
returned as prime minister. However, on many issues the non-socialists remained
divided (Peterson 1987). Consequently, the coalition could not agree on a set of
policies to counteract the deteriorating economic situation (Olsen 1984). Not only
were they unable to make significant reductions in public expenditure, but their
rule coincided with a particularly difficult time for the economy. The irony was
that the right wing administrations had nationalised and subsidised weak
industries, something the SAP had resisted (OECD 1978). This failure to improve
the economy led to disenchantment amongst the electorate. All the non-socialist
governments seemed to want was to maintain social democracy by whatever
means necessary (Callaghan 2000).
In this case, economic policy instrument settings changed (first order
policy change), but the instruments of economic policy, and the goals behind it,
remained much the same (Hall 1993). Table 1 summarizes the case study’s fit
with the hypotheses.
Table 1. Empirical Theoretical Fit for Sweden, 1976

Hypothesis

Evaluation

Hypothesis 1: Crisis to Initiate Debate Concerning Extant Policy

Yes

Hypothesis 2: Ideational Change (Extant Ideational Collapse and New
Ideational Consolidation)

No

Hypothesis 3: Third Order Policy Change

No

The economic crisis in Sweden failed to generate a significant level of
debate on alternatives to social democracy. While extant economic policy was
perceived as failing, change agents did not consolidate around a replacement
orthodoxy. This was primarily due to the absence of policy entrepreneurs putting
forward alternative ideas to social democracy and a political entrepreneur willing
to champion alternative ideas in the policy making environment (Figure 2).
Despite an economic crisis, criticisms of social democratic policies and their
underlying theories, and a change of government from SAP to a liberal coalition,
this orthodoxy endured. No political party leader, nor party, was willing to take on
this pillar of Swedish society for fear of electoral suicide. “Apart from disavowing
wage earner funds, the bourgeois parties offered no real alternative to SAP
policies” (Blyth 2002, 207). Ironically, the non-socialist coalitions went further
than the SAP in supporting industries in difficulty and ultimately failed to adjust
the expectations of the electorate to Sweden's straitened circumstances (Arter
2006).
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First
Order
Policy
Change

Political Entrepreneur
Political Elite
Policy Entrepreneur

No Political
Entrepreneur

Figure 2. The Absence of Political Entrepreneurs in Sweden, 1976

The United State of America, 1980/1981
The Economic Crisis. The last year of President Carter's administration was
marked by rising unemployment and high interest rates (OECD 1982b).
“Washingtonians joked that [Carter] was the first President with poll ratings lower
than the prime interest rate” (Boller 1996, 355). The president's implementation
of the Credit Control Act had the effect of reducing borrowing and putting a
dampener on economic growth (Hall 2003). By 1980 inflation reached 13.5
percent, its highest level since 1946, while GDP growth contracted (Mitchell
1998). The nonpartisan National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), with a
reputation for declaring when recessions start and finish, announced that the US
economy was in recession (Time 1980a). The Economic Report of the President
1981 showed an administration ready to “throw in the towel” on the economy
(Spulber 1995, 41). There was criticism of Carter’s plans to stimulate the
economy (Biven 2002). “Too little, too late, too political,” complained Murray
Weidenbaum of Washington University, providing “the opposite of what the
ailing economy needs” (Time 1980b, 34). Teaster (2004) points out that by late
autumn Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker acknowledged that the economy
was in recession. The problem was that the Fed, in tightly controlling the money
supply, caused interest rates to reach their highest levels in a century. The effect
was to reduce borrowing and send spending into decline (Weidenbaum 2011).
Thus, the combined actions of the Federal Reserve and the White House plunged
the economy into the recession that they had both been trying to avoid (Dark
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2001). Volcker's advocacy of a tightened money supply in order to reduce
inflation constituted a move towards monetarist policy (Krugman 1990).
However, the American public was very dissatisfied with the government's
performance.
Extant Ideational Collapse. The president's policies to reduce inflation, intended
to revive the economy and ensure his re-election, instead contributed to reduced
consumer borrowing, economic stagnation and his subsequent election defeat
(Sherman et al. 2008). The news media, such as the Washington Post, began to
openly declare that the economy was in a serious recession (Hargrove 1988).
Economists were generally of the opinion that there was little likelihood of an
economic recovery in the medium term. “The great stagflation swamp” was how
Walter Okun (1997) termed the situation. Alan Greenspan, a future chairman of
the Federal Reserve, observed that, as a consequence of the economy's stagnation,
President Carter found himself forced into an emergency program of restraint,
leading to a rapid rise in unemployment (Bilhartz and Elliott 2007). A result of
this situation was that economists, and other policy entrepreneurs, began to
gradually advocate a paradigm that they believed was capable of correcting the
problems in the economy: monetarism.
Various conservative think tanks, such as the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI) – a strong proponent of the free market since the late 1930s, had
been advocating monetarist ideas, as had economists such as Milton Friedman,
Karl Brunner of the University of Rochester, Arthur Laffer, Alan Meltzer of
Carnegie Mellon University, Robert Lucas, and the economic staff of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Blyth 1997; Weidenbaum 2011). Institutions and
economists of this perspective worked hard to ensure that economic journalism in
the media, for example in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, served as a
conduit for their ideas (Blyth 1997). The late 1970s also saw a group of mostly
Republican Congressmen and staffers advocating what became known as supply
side economics (Hogan 1990a). With policy entrepreneurs generally in agreement
as to the inadequacy of the extant paradigm, ideational collapse had occurred.
New Ideational Consolidation. The Republicans nominated Ronald Reagan as
their candidate for President. Adopting the role of a political entrepreneur, he
embraced the ideology of the New Right – a cultural conservatism stressing social
and moral issues, and advocating supply side economics. His campaign was to be
change orientated. This was emphasized in a campaign speech in Chicago
advocating the Kemp-Roth economic formula (Hogan 1990a). He had a simple
message: low taxes, reduced spending on social services, balanced budgets, and
fewer government regulations. Advocacy of supply side economics fit particularly
well with Reagan’s view that the citizens could resolve the country’s problems if
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there was less governmental interference in their lives (Wallison 2003). Reagan
urged a bold program of tax reductions, spending restraints, and regulatory
reforms that would inject new life into the economy (Hogan 1990b). Where Barry
Goldwater had failed in 1964, Reagan was convinced he could triumph in 1980
(Hirsh 2010).
Reagan laid the blame for the recession at the door of the president, saying
that Carter's policies had stifled productivity while increasing both inflation and
unemployment (Hirsh 2010). Reagan succeeded in building an electoral coalition
around the concept of monetarism and won the 1980 presidential election on the
back of advocating a marked set of alternative economic ideas which could used
to supplant extant arrangements (Blyth 1997). Reagan's election victory, and the
Republicans’ regaining of control of the Senate for the first time since 1954, were
seen as providing a mandate for monetarist policies (OECD 1982b). In the midst
of an economic crisis there was a collapse in confidence in the dominant
economic orthodoxy. Various economists, think tanks, and other interest groups,
acting as policy entrepreneurs and advocating monetarist economic ideas,
consolidated around Reagan in the role of a political entrepreneur. This
acceptance of monetarism as a viable alternative orthodoxy constituted ideational
change.
Several economic, ideological, and social trends contributed to Reagan’s
appeal. The 1970s witnessed growing middle class opposition to the taxes
necessary to sustain programs such as social security. This burden became greater
as the economic depression deepened, leading to a questioning of existing policies
and their underlying ideas.
Third Order Policy Change. Reagan utilized anti-government sentiment to his
advantage, emphasizing the importance of individualism and a smaller role for the
federal government. The monetarist proposals of policy entrepreneur Arthur
Laffer played a large role in Reagan's economic strategy. For the problem of
stagflation he promoted a seemingly straightforward remedy: tax cuts, wherein
the resulting stimulus would boost the federal government's revenues to balance
the budget, consequently reducing inflationary pressure (Dallek 1984). Reagan’s
uncomplicated patriotism acted as a balm to the wounded national psyche.
However, the victory of New Conservatism was also driven by the challenge to
America’s economic hegemony by West Germany and Japan (Renshaw 1991).
President Reagan's new economic program, dubbed Reaganomics by the media,
was built upon the belief that reductions in regulations and taxes would allow the
economy to rebound. Thus, new economic policies were drawn along lines that
were very different from those of preceding governments in their theoretical and
political origins (OECD 1982b).
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The first budget the new president sent to Congress proposed a $750
billion tax cut, built around a 30 percent reduction in federal income tax over
three years (Jones 1995). It was bold and original, the largest tax reduction in US
history (Peterson and Rom 1988). The administration also reduced spending on
unemployment benefits programs, job training programs, public works and trade
adjustment assistance benefits by $11 billion (Jones 1995). These were all moves
advocated by David Stockman at the Office of Management and Budget as a
means of cutting taxes, increasing defense expenditure, and balancing the budget
(Peele 1990). For Stockman this marked a clear break with past policy (Stockman
1981). Middle and working class Americans, who had organised “tax revolts”
from Massachusetts to California, applauded this policy (Jones 1995).
The new administration sought to reduce regulation across the economy
and towards that end it abolished the Council on Wage and Price Stability (OECD
1982b). Following Reagan's election, economic policy instrument settings, the
instruments of economic policy, and the hierarchy of goals behind economic
policy all changed. This transformation in economic policy endured into the
administrations of Reagan’s successors. As such, D’Souza (1997) regards
Reagan’s program for the economy as the most ambitious in the half century
following the Great Depression.
Wallison (2003) argues that Reagan, coming as he did with a fully
developed philosophy of government, represented a set of ideas that reformulated
Republican policy to tap into traditional American values – private sector based
economic growth and individual opportunity. In addition to reorienting the GOP,
he persuaded Americans that there was another way to think about their economy
and government. This resulted in the radical shift in economic policy that lay at
the heart of the "Reagan Revolution" (Weatherford and McDonnell 2005). For
Wallison (2003) this marked a historic turning point in the US, even arguing that
the Republicans’ 1994 takeover of Congress was largely based on Reagan’s
enduring ideas. Reagan’s economic policies changed the economic and political
landscape of 1980s America, and an examination of the 1990s shows that the
thrust of these policies remained essentially intact over a decade later (Busch
2005). Table 2 summarizes the case study’s fit with the hypotheses.
Table 2. Empirical Theoretical Fit for the US, 1980/1981

Hypothesis

Evaluation

Hypothesis 1: Crisis to Initiate Debate Concerning Extant Policy

Yes

Hypothesis 2: Ideational Change (Extant Ideational Collapse and New
Ideational Consolidation)

Yes

Hypothesis 3: Third Order Policy Change

Yes
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A severe economic crisis led policy entrepreneurs and outside influences
to contest the viability of extant economic policies. These attacks on extant policy
led to the collapse of the ideas underlying it. In this environment, an
entrepreneurial network of policy entrepreneurs advocated a replacement set of
ideas: monetarism. Political entrepreneur Ronald Reagan, willing to promote
monetarism as an alternative approach to running the economy, managed to
consolidate the entrepreneurial network advocating this new economic orthodoxy,
resulting in ideational change. Following Reagan’s election as president he
implemented a third order change (paradigm shift) (see Figure 3) in macroeconomic policy (Hall 1993). Thus, a macro-economic crisis, the initiation of a
policy debate, ideational change, and a change of government, all contributed to
the paradigm shift in economic policy that took place in America after 1981.
However, the crucial element was Ronald Reagan. Acting as the archetypal
political entrepreneur, after consolidating policy entrepreneurs around a new
economic ideational structure, he was willing to champion those ideas once in
power, injecting them into the political environment. This led directly to a radical
change in macro-economic policy.

Third
Order
Policy
Change

Political Entrepreneur
Political Elite
Policy Entrepreneur

Political Entrepreneur:
Ronald Reagan

Figure 3. The Presence of a Political Entrepreneur in the US, 1980/1981

Conclusion
This paper sought to uncover the inner mechanisms of policy change and,
specifically, how ideas enter the political arena to enact change. We argue that
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reliance on exogenous shocks to account for policy change is too simplistic and
fails to explain the absence of change in the wake of a crisis. The central thesis
was that the introduction of new ideas into the policy environment, and their
transformation into policy, was due to the activities of “entrepreneurial networks”
of policy entrepreneurs, with political entrepreneurs at their head. The
entrepreneurial network is, as Schumpeter (1934) argued in relation to economic
entrepreneurs, a vibrant endogenous driver of creative destruction, where new
policies are formed to replace old and failing ones.
The cases examined were Sweden in the mid 1970s and the US at the start
of the 1980s. In each case there was economic crisis, criticisms of existing
economic policy, resultant policy debates, and changes of government and
political leaders. In the case of Sweden, there was no economic ideational
change, whereas in the US there was. While ideational collapse occurred in
Sweden, policy entrepreneurs, lacking a political entrepreneur, failed to
consolidate around a viable alternative idea. Without ideational change, there was
only minor policy change. In the US, ideational collapse was followed by
ideational change and, subsequently, third order policy change, as an
entrepreneurial network of policy entrepreneurs, all advocating monetarism,
consolidated around a political entrepreneur in the form of Ronald Reagan. The
difference between the level of economic policy change in the US on the one hand
and Sweden on the other was due to the presence of an entrepreneurial network
and a political entrepreneur.
In Sweden, the intermediary necessary to bridge the gap between the ideas
of policy entrepreneurs and the political institutions was missing. While an
economic crisis initiated debate on existing economic policies and their
underlying ideas, this crisis did not result in policy change. Policy change remains
firmly dependent upon political entrepreneur led entrepreneurial networks
consolidating around new economic ideas, which the political entrepreneur then
introduces to the institutional environment. The political entrepreneur is the
primary and endogenous force responsible for policy change.
However, a limitation of this paper is that the framework set out here is
tested within relatively stable political/policy systems, into which political
entrepreneurs can inject new ideas. An alternative would be to test this framework
in the context of institutional instability, wherein the political entrepreneur might
not be an endogenous entity. Such an examination would test the limitations of
the framework's hypotheses, allowing for their modification and the strengthening
of the framework.
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